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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a final 
order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
pursuant to § 78-2-2 (3)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The action below concerned Hazeltine Corporation's bad faith 
breach of a teaming agreement and subcontract with E-Systems, 
Inc./Montek Division ("E-Systems"), under which E-Systems was to 
provide Precision Distance Measurement Equipment ("DME/P"), a 
subcomponent for a next-generation landing system being developed 
by Hazeltine Corporation ("Hazeltine") for the Federal Aviation 
Administration ("FAA"). Hazeltine forced E-Systems to implement 
out-of-scope design changes to the DME/P, and then prejudiced E-
Systems' ability to recover the costs of those changes under the 
administrative appeals procedure contemplated by the subcontract. 
Hazeltine hindered E-Systemsf work on the subcontract by refusing 
to provide testing assistance and other support required by E-
Systems to complete the DME/P. Then, Hazeltine simply walked away 
from its obligations under both the subcontract and teaming 
agreement. 
Instead of allowing E-Systems to proceed on its breach claims 
and claims based upon Hazeltinefs bad faith conduct, the Court 
below misconstrued a "Disputes" clause in the subcontract to 
require that E-Systems pursue an inapplicable, inadequate, and 
time-consuming administrative appeal with the FAA as a pre-
requisite to E-Systems1 instituting any suit in Utah against 
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Hazeltine. That Disputes Clause has a limited purpose and 
expressly does not apply to breaches of the subcontract or 
disputes solely between Hazeltine and E-Systems. Moreover, the 
Disputes clause was wrongly invoked because it cannot sufficiently 
remedy E-Systemsf claims against Hazeltine* Even if the court was 
correct to require E-Systems to first pursue this administrative 
procedure of the Disputes Clause — which it clearly was not — 
the court improperly selected to dismiss instead of to stay E-
Systems1 action in Utah pending exhaustion of that administrative 
appeals procedure. In granting the defendants motion to dismiss 
and, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, the Court 
improperly denied E-Systems its rightful choice of forum in the 
Utah courts. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the Court below err in holding, as a matter of law, 
that "the Disputes Clause of the Subcontract requires that the 
claims, causes of action and counts set forth in E-Systems1 
complaint be resolved in accordance with the procedures and 
provisions of subparagraphs (b) through (e) thereof"? 
A. Do the procedures at subparagraphs (b) through (e) of 
the Subcontract Disputes Clause apply to E-Systems' 
claims for bad faith and breach of the Subcontract which 
do not, by definition, "arise under" the Subcontract? 
B. Did the Court below err in holding, as a matter of law, 
that "The language of the Disputes Clause of the 
Subcontract is complete, clear, unambiguous and not 
2 
subject to interpretation" so as to exclude parol 
evidence as to the meaning of that clause? 
C Do the procedures at subparagraphs (b) through (e) of 
the Subcontract Disputes Clause, which rely on the 
"remedy-granting" provisions in the Subcontract, afford 
E-Sytems complete relief for its claims as set forth in 
its complaint? 
D. Do the procedures at subparagraphs (b) through (e) of 
the Subcontract Disputes Clause apply to disputes solely 
between Hazeltine and E-Systems that are not the result 
of actions of the FAA and therefore not subject to 
appeal to the FAA, including but not limited to: (1) 
that portion of E-Systems1 claims against Hazeltine that 
Hazeltine refused to certify to the FAA Contracting 
Officer pursuant to the Subcontract Disputes Clause and 
(2) E-Systems1 claims alleging breach of the Teaming 
Agreement, even though the Teaming Agreement is an 
independent contract that has no Disputes Clause, does 
not contain any other provision purporting to require 
that disputes relating to the Teaming Agreement be 
resolved in any predetermined manner, and does not 
expressly or impliedly incorporate the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause? 
2. Did the Court below err in holding, as a matter of law, 
that "The Disputes Clause of the Subcontract has not been rendered 
useless and does not fail of its essential purpose"? 
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3. Did the Court below err in failing to stay the action 
below, so as to preserve E-Systemsf choice of forum, as opposed to 
granting the defendant's motion to dismiss and, in the 
alternative, motion for summary judgment? 
IV. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issues 1 and 2 address conclusions of law, which are reviewed 
de novo for correctness without any special deference to the trial 
court. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No, 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co, . 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); Bailev v. Call. 100 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11, 767 P.2d 138 (Ct. App.), cert, denied. 773 P.2d 45 
(1989). This "correction of error" standard of review applies to 
orders granting summary judgment as well as orders to dismiss. 
See, e.g. , Barber v. Farmers Ins. Exch. . 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather 
than fact? reviewing court is free to reappraise the trial court's 
legal conclusions). Issue 3, concerning failure to stay 
proceedings below, is subject to Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate procedure, which addresses an appellate court's inherent 
power to modify, as appropriate, an erroneous order. 
V. RELEVANT FACTS 
Two years ago, Hazeltine Corporation walked away from a 
government contract with the FAA for the development and 
installation of a next-generation airport landing system called a 
Microwave Landing System ("MLS") at various airports across the 
United States. Record at 12-13 (Complaint 15 24-27). At first, 
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Hazeltine stopped work on that contract under the guise of an 
unauthorized "study period"; then, Hazeltine informed the FAA that 
it considered its contract breached by the FAA and simply stopped 
working. Record at 11 (Complaint J 22), 554 (Brimhall Affidavit 
M 9, 13 ) . 
Hazeltine made this decision to stop work because the 
alternative of completing the contract would have forced it to 
swallow a huge cost overrun. The huge cash drain associated with 
pressing ahead was both immediate and inevitable. Although 
stopping work on the contract meant that the FAA would terminate 
its contract for default (which the FAA ultimately did on August 
7, 1989), Hazeltine knew it could forestall any immediate cash 
loss and possibly avoid it altogether if Hazeltine could make 
stick its allegation of breach by the FAA. 
When Hazeltine turned its back on the FAA contract, however, 
it also turned its back on E-Systems, its principal subcontractor. 
During the so-called "study period," Hazeltine attempted to 
maintain the pretense of an on-going contractual relationship with 
E-Systems. It sent E-Systems letters instructing it to perform 
work that had, in fact, already been performed and suggested that 
E-Systems start working on other aspects of the subcontract work 
that were either out of sequence or inappropriate at the time. 
Record at 555 (Brimhall Affidavit J 13). After a time, however, 
Hazeltine even stopped trying to maintain this facade. 
For a period now approaching two years, Hazeltine has done 
nothing. Hazeltine has provided to E-Systems no word at all 
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regarding work under the subcontract, nor has it attempted to 
invoke any right to terminate the subcontract. 1/ Faced with this 
situation, E-Systems sued Hazeltine to recover its damages for 
breach of the subcontract and breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing under the subcontract. 
No one could have anticipated this sad state of events back 
in December 7, 1982, when Hazeltine and E-Systems signed the first 
of two "Teaming Agreements" for the purpose of combining their 
technical and business resources to forge a "working relationship11 
that they hoped would "lead to the maximization of the sale and/or 
licensing of the MLS and DME/P equipments as a system throughout 
the world." 2/ Record at 4, 92 (Complaint S 6 & Exhibit 2, 
Teaming Agreement at f 15) . Central to both Teaming Agreements 
was a requirement that Hazeltine include E-Systems in all key 
discussions with the FAA relevant to E-Systemsf product. Record 
at 24-25, 86 (Complaint, Exhibit 1 (1985 Teaming Agreement J 4) 
1/ Hazeltine has asserted that the Prime Contract has been 
terminated for convenience by the FAA. Record at 674 (Hazeltine1s 
Reply Brief, Exhibit 1, Hazeltine Complaint J 186 ("The default 
termination should be converted to a termination for convenience 
entitling Hazeltine to recover its costs plus profit in accordance 
with the termination for convenience clause.")). If that is the 
case, however, Hazeltine is obligated to terminate E-Systems for 
convenience under the Subcontract, a step it has thus far been 
unwilling to take. Record at 314 (Complaint, Exhibit 3, 
Subcontract at 110-10, "Termination for Convenience of the 
Government," FPR 1-8.705-1, June 1964 (contractor must "terminate 
all orders and subcontracts to the extent that they relate to the 
performance of work terminated by the notice of termination")). 
Failure to take action under this clause is a breach of the 
Subcontract. 
2J The quotation is contained in the second Teaming 
Agreement, signed on December 21, 1985. 
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and Exhibit 2 (1982 Teaming Agreement 5 2)). Despite Hazeltinefs 
unqualified obligation to involve E-Systems in all decisions 
affecting the MLS Program, over the next eight years after the 
formation of the Hazeltine/E-Systems "team," Hazeltine repeatedly 
breached this obligation. Record at 11 (Complaint 55 22, 23), 
554-55 (Brimhall Affidavit J 9), 
Having forged this ambitious alliance with Hazeltine, E-
Systems spent the next couple of years developing, at its own 
expense, the DME/P component of the MLS. Record at 4-5 (Complaint 
55 6-8). The parties agreed that this advance development effort 
would give the Hazeltine/E-Systems team an advantage in competing 
for the FAA contract. Both parties also fully understood that the 
design resulting from E-Systems1 pre-contract work would be the 
basis for the technical and price proposals for the DME/P portion 
of the MLS to be supplied under contract to the FAA. Record at 5-
6, 8 (Complaint 55 8-10, 16), 552-54 (Brimhall Affidavit 55 3, 7). 
By January 12, 1984, when the FAA awarded to Hazeltine Contract 
DTFA01-84-C-0008 (the "Prime Contractff) for the delivery of 178 
Microwave Landing Systems, E-Systems1 design of the DME/P was 
essentially complete. Record at 6-7 (Complaint 55 10-12, 15), 552 
(Brimhall Affidavit 5 3). 
After receiving the award of the Prime Contract, Hazeltine 
sent E-Systems a telex, dated January 31, 1984, authorizing E-
Systems to proceed with work. Record at 7 (Complaint 5 12). E-
Systems performed under this telex authorization until December 
21, 1985, when Hazeltine and E-Systems executed Subcontract No. 
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K25213 (the "Subcontract"). Record at 7 (Complaint 5 13). Along 
with the Subcontract, the parties, anticipating a potential 
worldwide market of 2,600 DME/P Systems, signed a new Teaming 
Agreement governing the current MLS effort as well as any 
follow-on awards or enlargements of the Prime Contract. Record at 
7 (Complaint 5 13), 554 (Brimhall Affidavit f 6). 
The Subcontract contained a clause entitled "Article XXXVIII 
Disputes" ("Subcontract Disputes Clause") setting forth the 
procedure to be used in resolving certain disputes between 
Hazeltine and E-Systems. Record at 345 (Complaint, Exhibit 3, 
Subcontract at 112). At the time the Subcontract Disputes Clause 
was negotiated, the parties understood that the clause was to 
apply only to claims related to in-scope changes and not outright 
breaches of the Subcontract. Record at 553 (Brimhall Affidavit J 
5), 579-80 (Hopkins Affidavit 55 2, 3). For in-scope changes, the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause contains an administrative appeals 
process that involves review of certain subcontractor claims by 
the FAA Contracting Officer, who will render a final decision 
(subject to appeal) on whether or not the FAA will accept ultimate 
liability for the claim. This process presumes that Hazeltine 
will submit to the FAA Contracting Officer only E-Systemsf claims 
based upon FAA actions that affected Hazeltine1s Prime Contract 
that, in turn, affected E-Systems1 work under the Subcontract. 
Record at 579-80 (Hopkins Affidavit J 3). The parties agreed 
that all other disputes, i.e., those concerning Subcontract 
breaches and claims not based upon FAA actions, would be decided 
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by a court of competent jurisdiction. Record at 553 (Brimhall 
Affidavit 5 5), 579-80 (Hopkins Affidavit H 2, 3). 
Hazeltine and the FAA wasted no time in imposing upon E-
Systems a series of major design changes to the DME/P. These 
changes constituted a breach of the Subcontract because they were 
so pervasive that they changed the fundamental character of E-
Systems1 original design for the DME/P. Record at 9 (Complaint 5 
17), 554 (Brimhall Affidavit 1 7). To accommodate these changes, 
E-Systems was forced to scrap its pre-Subcontract investment in 
the original design of the DME/P and incur enormous redesign 
expenses ("nonrecurring" costs) that were not contemplated by the 
parties when the Subcontract was formed. Record at 9-10 
(Complaint 55 18-21). These changes also precipitated additional 
"recurring" costs, i.e.. those costs associated with manufacturing 
each DME/P. Record at 10 (Complaint f 20). 
Hazeltine added to the time and expense of performing the 
Subcontract by failing to provide agreed upon support to E-
Systems. From June 1988 on, Hazeltine unreasonably withheld 
approval of First Article Test procedures, failed to make 
Hazeltine's inspectors reasonably available to witness required 
testing of the DME/P equipment, and generally failed to provide 
other support necessary for E-Systems to perform the Subcontract. 
Record at 12-13 (Complaint ff 24, 25), 555 (Brimhall Affidavit f 
10). This lack of cooperation was totally unjustified, was not a 
result of any action by or encouragement from the FAA, and was not 
due to any action or failure to act on the part of E-Systems. 
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In August 1988, Hazeltine unilaterally declared, over the 
FAA's strong protest, the unauthorized "study period11 mentioned 
above. Record at 11 (Complaint 1 22), 554 (Brimhall Affidavit J 
8). Initially, this "study period" was nothing more than a ploy 
to pressure the FAA into re-negotiating a portion of the Prime 
Contract known as the "turnkey" effort involving actual 
installation of the MLS at various airports. (E-Systems was not 
involved in the "turnkey" effort and thus could not possibly 
benefit from the "study period" ploy.) It was during this so-
called "study period" that Hazeltine attempted to disguise the 
delay it had imposed on E-Systems by directing it to perform tasks 
that were already complete or inappropriate to that stage of the 
program. Record at 13-14 (Complaint 55 25-27), 555-56 (Brimhall 
Affidavit 5 13) Also during this "study period," Hazeltine, 
without involving or even informing E-Systems, negotiated with the 
FAA regarding restructuring the overall performance obligations of 
the Prime Contract, despite the fact that the negotiations clearly 
affected E-Systems1 obligations and the fact that failure to 
include E-Systems in such discussions violated the Teaming 
Agreement. Record at 11 (Complaint 55 22, 23), 554-55 (Brimhall 
Affidavit 5 9)* 
As the relationship between the FAA and Hazeltine continued 
to deteriorate, Hazeltine became increasingly less cooperative 
with its subcontractor E-Systems. Hazeltine1s recalcitrance 
became quite pronounced beginning November 30, 1988, the date on 
which E-Systems submitted to Hazeltine its first claim for 
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equitable adjustment seeking an additional $5,000,000 for 
non-recurring costs associated with the massive design changes to 
the DME/P. Record at 10 (Complaint f 21), 556-57 (Brimhall 
Affidavit J5 14, 15). 
Hazeltine had instructed E-Systems to prepare its claims 
under the Subcontract on the basis of filing a joint 
Hazeltine/E-Systems request to the FAA for a price adjustment. 
Hazeltine, during the same period, however, secretly negotiated 
with the FAA and signed, without E-Systems1 knowledge or consent, 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MM0U,f) , dated December 7, 1988, 
which specifically excluded E-Systems1 claims from those claims 
that Hazeltine intended to submit to the FAA under the Prime 
Contract. Record at 11-12 (Complaint 55 22, 23). Hazeltine1s 
failure to include E-Systems in the negotiations leading to the 
Memorandum of Understanding violated the Teaming Agreement 
provision requiring E-Systems to be included in important 
discussions with the FAA. Record at 11 (Complaint 5 23) . 
Moreover, this MOU itself was contrary to subparagraph (d) of the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause, which provides that Hazeltine shall 
not enter into any settlement or agreement with the FAA which 
would prejudice E-Systems' rights under the Subcontract Disputes 
Clause. Record at 346 (Complaint, Exhibit 3, Subcontract at 112). 
The MOU was also contrary to the direct representation by 
Hazeltine that the parties would jointly submit such claims. 
Having made this undisclosed agreement with the FAA, Hazeltine 
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then unreasonably delayed by five months the submission to the FAA 
of the E-Systems1 non-recurring cost claims. 
When Hazeltine ultimately did certify E-Systems1 claims for 
non-recurring costs on April 20, 1989, however, Hazeltine did not 
pass through a significant portion of those claims, thereby 
admitting that these portions were due solely to Hazeltine1s 
actions as opposed to any actions of the FAA* Record at 568-70 
(E-Systems1 Brief in Opposition, Exhibit A.3.)* On March 19, 
1990, Hazeltine again refused to submit to the FAA a portion of a 
subsequent E-Systems claim for recurring costs, presumably because 
Hazeltine did not want to attempt to attribute to the FAA the 
increased costs associated with that portion of E-Systems1 claim. 
In short, by failing to pass through these claims to the FAA, 
Hazeltine has by its actions conceded, at least with respect that 
portion of E-Systems1 claims, the inapplicability of the 
administrative appeals process of the Subcontract Disputes Clause. 
Although Hazeltine had numerous opportunities to repair its 
relations with the FAA and continue work under the Prime Contract, 3/ 
it did not take any reasonable steps to avoid the FAA's decision 
of August 7, 1989 to terminate the Prime Contract for default. 
3/ On November 16, 1988, the FAA issued Modification 0026 
to the Prime Contract, which essentially excused Hazeltinefs 
previous non-performance and imposed a much-relaxed delivery 
schedule. Record at 558 (Brimhall Affidavit IJ 17, 18). Although 
E-Systems was prepared to complete Subcontract work under the new 
schedule, Hazeltine persisted in its refusal to perform and 
responded to FAA by alleging Modification 0026 was a breach of 
contract. Record at 558 (Brimhall Affidavit 5 18), 582-83 (E-
Systems1 Brief in Opposition, Exhibit C). 
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Record at 558 (Brimhall Affidavit Jf 18# 19). In fact, Hazeltine 
failed to take any action whatsoever to avert termination, even 
though it knew that such a termination would seriously impair 
E-Systems1 opportunity to receive payment for its work under the 
Subcontract and to recover under the Subcontract Disputes Clause 
on its pending claims for recurring and nonrecurring costs. 
Based upon the foregoing litany of bad faith acts and 
Hazeltinefs deliberate abandonment of the Subcontract, E-Systems 
sued Hazeltine in Utah court for breach of the Subcontract, breach 
of the Teaming Agreement, and breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing contained in both the Subcontract and 
the Teaming Agreement. 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County heard 
Hazeltine!s Motions to Stay, or, in the alternative, Motion to 
Dismiss, or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment on 
E-Systems' claims, and held that the Subcontract Disputes Clause 
requires that the claims, causes of action and counts set forth in 
E-Systemsf Complaint be resolved in accordance with the 
administrative procedures and provisions of subparagraphs (b) 
through (e) thereof. In addition, the Court held that: the 
language of the Subcontract Disputes Clause is complete, clear, 
unambiguous and not subject to more than one interpretation; 
exhaustion of the administrative appeal procedure of subparagraphs 
(b) through (e) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause is a condition 
precedent to initiation by E-Systems of any litigation against 
Hazeltine in the Utah courts based upon the Subcontract or Teaming 
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Agreement; and the Subcontract Disputes Clause had not been 
rendered useless and did not fail of its essential purpose. 
Upon entering its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
the Court granted Hazeltine's Motion to Dismiss and, in the 
alternative, granted Hazeltine's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
E-Systems filed its notice of appeal of the Court's order on 
February 1, 1990; and filed its Docketing Statement on February 
15, 1990. 
VI. SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The central issue in this appeal concerns the interpretation 
and proper application of the Subcontract Disputes Clause. That 
clause contemplates that certain types of disputes between 
Hazeltine and E-Systems under the Subcontract — specifically, 
those resulting from FAA action which do not amount to a breach of 
the Subcontract — will be subject to an administrative appeals 
procedure that is set forth in paragraphs (e) through (f) of the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause. All other disputes shall be heard 
by any court of competent jurisdiction. 
The Court below misconstrued the Subcontract Disputes Clause 
to require that "the claims, causes of action and counts set forth 
in E-Systems1 complaint" against Hazeltine in the Utah courts "be 
resolved in accordance with the procedures and provisions of 
subparagraphs (b) through (e) thereof." Record at 767 (conclusion 
of law no. 3). Contrary to the Court's conclusion, this procedure 
was never meant to address such concerns because it expressly does 
not (1) govern breaches of the Subcontract or (2) disputes not 
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otherwise "subject to appeal11 to the FAA Contracting Officer. 
Moreover, the Subcontract Disputes Clause clearly was never 
intended to address breaches of the wholly independent Teaming 
Agreements. 
In reaching its incorrect conclusions, the Court below 
improperly failed to consider the language of the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause in the proper context — i.e., the field of 
government contracting. The Court also incorrectly invoked the 
parol evidence rule to preclude consideration of the evidence that 
E-Systems provided to show the actual intent of the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause. 
The Court below also erred in requiring E-Systems, under any 
interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause, to pursue an 
administrative appeals procedure that had "failed of its essential 
purpose" as a consequence of Hazeltine's bad faith abandonment of 
the Subcontract and its breach of the very terms of the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause. Assuming, arguendo, that the administrative 
appeals procedure applies to E-Systems claims — which it clearly 
does not — the Court below improperly denied E-Systerns its 
rightful choice of forum by failing to stay the proceedings in Utah 
pending the outcome of an administrative appeal. For the foregoing 
reasons, the lower Courtfs holdings as to these conclusions of law 
should be reversed and its order granting Hazeltine's motion to 
dismiss and, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment should 
be vacated by this Court on appeal. 
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VII. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
As a preliminary point, E-Systems notes that the Court below, 
although it was not required to do so, entered "findings of fact" 
to support its order granting Hazeltinefs motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P") 12(b)(6) and, 
in the alternative, motion for summary judgment under U.R.C.P. 56 
(c). Such findings are grounds for reversal if those findings of 
fact themselves evidence the existence of controverted and material 
issues of fact. See, e.g.. Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. 
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered. 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) 
(grant of summary judgment precluded where findings of fact 
evidenced material issues of fact) . Such is clearly the case here, 
for E-Systems objected to numerous proposed findings of fact on the 
basis that they assumed controverted facts. See Record at 717-29, 
(E-Systems1 Objections to Hazeltine's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law). Specifically, E-Systems denied: (1) the 
clear implication in several findings of fact that E-Systems at 
some earlier point in time had agreed with Hazeltine's present 
interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause (Record 
at 718-21, objections to findings of fact nos. 6, 9, 11, & 13); 
(2) that Hazeltine had undertaken an ••analysis" of E-Systems1 
claims (Record at 719-20, objections to findings of fact numbers 
8 & 12) ; (3) that communications between E-Systems and Hazeltine 
referenced in the proposed findings were "for the purpose of 
submitting a certified claim to the FAA under the Contract Disputes 
Act" (Record at 719-20, objections to findings of fact nos. 8, 9, 
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& 12); and (4) that the Disputes Clause of the Subcontract "was 
intended to work in concert with the disputes procedure of the 
prime contract." (Emphasis added.) Record at 723 (objection to 
finding of fact no. 22). All of the above findings, in one way or 
another, refer to the underlying intent of the parties with respect 
to resolving disputes under the Subcontract, and thereby undercut 
any basis for summary judgment under U.R.C.P 56(c) or dismissal 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 4/ 
A. The Court Misconstrued the Subcontract Disputes Clause 
to Require that E-Systems1 Claims Against Hazeltine in 
Utah Court Be Subject to the Administrative Appeals 
Process. 
To those familiar with "Disputes" clauses typically used in 
government contracts, the Subcontract Disputes Clause does have a 
"complete, clear, and unambiguous meaning," but it is not the 
meaning adopted by the Court below. Specifically, the Court below 
misconstrued paragraph (a) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause, 
which reads: 
(a) Any dispute arising under this order which 
is not subject to appeal pursuant to 
subparagraphs (b) thru (e) below and which is 
not disposed of by agreement between Hazeltine 
4/ Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty. Inc.. 657 P.2d 1333 
(Utah 1983) (doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues 
of fact must be construed "in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment."); Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434 
(Utah 1982) (summary judgment is only granted if the record shows 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Liquor 
Control Commfn. v. Athas. 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441, 443 (1952) 
(complaint does not fail to state claim under Rule 12(b)(6) unless 
defendant can show that plaintiff "would be entitled to no relief 
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its 
claim."); Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv. Inc.. 
24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605, 607 (1970) (same). 
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and E-Systems shall be decided in any court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
Unlike the run-of-the-mill arbitration provision which lumps 
together all manner of disputes and requires the parties to a 
contract to submit all such disputes to arbitration, 5/ this 
5/ Hazeltine argued below that the Subcontract's Disputes 
Clause is analogous to an arbitration clause and urged the Court 
to apply the same "public policy" considerations applicable to 
interpretation of arbitration clauses to determine whether 
E-Systems was bound by the Subcontract Disputes Clause to submit 
its claims first for consideration under the administrative appeals 
process. See Record at 407-12 (Hazeltinefs Reply Brief at 9-14). 
Even if the Subcontract Disputes Clause can be compared to an 
arbitration clause — an analogy that E-Systems rejects — 
Hazeltine is wrong to suggest that "public policy" requires, or 
even favors, an overly-broad reading of the Subcontract Disputes 
Clause that would require E-Systems to process its disputes through 
an inapplicable administrative appeals procedure. 
On the contrary, if "public policy" is at all applicable to 
the Court's interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause, it 
would weigh against forcing E-Systems to relinquish its right to 
proceed in the Utah courts. Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
In accordance with the above provision, Utah courts will not 
refuse to exercise their jurisdiction "unless factors preponderate 
so strongly against trying the case [in Utah that to proceed] would 
work a great hardship on the defendant." See Summa Corp. v. Lancer 
Indus.. Inc.. 559 P.2d 544 (Utah 1977) (denying motion to dismiss 
based upon forum non conveniens); Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande 
R.R. Co., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (Utah 1950) (discretion to 
close state court to plaintiff should not be exercised where 
underlying purpose is to stall or delay). 
Hazeltine relied heavily on Lindon City v. Engineers 
Construction Co.. 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981) to support its argument 
18 
clause, as explained below, expressly applies only to certain types 
of disputes and contemplates that other disputes "shall be decided 
in any court of competent jurisdiction." 
On the question of which disputes are subject to the 
administrative disputes procedure versus the judicial procedure, 
E-Systems reads paragraph (a) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause 
to modify the parties' common law right to resort to the courts 
only with respect to that subset of disputes "arising under this 
order." The Subcontract Disputes Clause is silent as to disputes 
not "arising under the order," and therefore does not purport to 
that the Subcontract Disputes Clause was tantamount to an 
arbitration clause under which E-Systems had waived its right to 
a judicial proceeding. Lindon City considered whether a state 
statute requiring arbitration of disputes violated Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, set forth above. Although 
the court in Lindon City identified an exception to Article I, 
Section 11 applicable when a party intentionally waives the 
ordinary and usual judicial remedy to which it is entitled under 
the Utah Constitution, the court stressed that such a waiver must 
be expressed in "the most unequivocal terms." Lindon City. 636 
P.2d at 1074. 
Even if the arbitration analogy were valid in this case — 
which it is not — it would be premature to apply the Lindon Citv 
"exception" to the right of a party to proceed expeditiously in 
Utah courts before determining what types of disputes E-Systems 
actually agreed to submit to the administrative disputes resolution 
process. As discussed below, the Subcontract Disputes Clause does 
not mandate that all disputes are subject to the administrative 
appeals procedure; some disputes "shall be decided by any court of 
competent jurisdiction." If E-Systems is correct that the claims 
raised in its complaint fall into the category of disputes that are 
subject to judicial resolution, E-Systems obviously will not have 
"unequivocally" waived its right to proceed immediately in the Utah 
courts on those claims. 
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alter E-Systems1 state constitutional right to seek a judicial 
resolution of its disputes in the Utah courts. 6/ 
Disputes "arising under the order" that are also "subject to 
appeal pursuant to subparagraphs (b) thru (e)" of the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause will be handled under the administrative appeals 
procedure thereof. Conversely, disputes "arising under the order" 
that are not "subject to appeal . • • shall be decided by any court 
of competent jurisdiction." 
As described more fully below, whether a dispute is subject 
to the administrative appeals procedure depends upon whether the 
parties have established contractually-prescribed remedies that 
are adequate to deal with the situation — for example, a clause 
that allows for a day-for-day adjustment to the delivery schedule 
resulting from buyer imposed delays. In this sense, the 
administrative process presumes that the dispute does not rise to 
6/ Hazeltine argued below that "If E-Systems' argument is 
correct that the phrase 'arising under1 is a limitation on the 
types of actions encompassed by this provision, the result of the 
argument is that actions that do not arise under the Subcontract 
may not be brought in a court." Record at 614-15 (Reply Brief at 
11-12). Hazeltine then argues that "this Court need not apply such 
an illogical distinction between which actions that may and may not 
be brought in court." Id. Hazeltine's solution to what it 
disingenuously characterized as an "illogical" result was to simply 
pretend that the words "arising under the order" have no meaning 
or significance whatsoever. 
E-Systems, however, never argued for the "illogical" 
interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes Clause suggested by 
Hazeltine. E-Systems did argue that the Subcontract Disputes 
Clause, by referring only to disputes "arising under the order," 
carves out only a subclass of disputes and modifies the usual 
disputes procedure at common law — i.e.. resort to the courts — 
only for that subclass of disputes. For disputes not "arising 
under the order" the parties are free to pursue the usual judicial 
remedy. This interpretation is not "illogical." 
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the level of a breach of the contract, because the parties 
contemplated a situation in advance of contracting and established 
a contractual mechanism adequate to resolve the situation. When 
the contractually-prescribed remedies fail to adequately address 
the situation — as they have in this case due to Hazeltinefs 
outright repudiation of the Subcontract — the administrative 
appeals process simply cannot apply. 
1. The Subcontract Disputes Clause Does Not Govern the 
Claims Asserted by E-Systems Against Hazeltine in 
Utah Court Because That Clause Applies Only to That 
Subset of Disputes "Arising Under This Order." 
Hazeltine convinced the Court below to adopt Hazeltinefs 
overly-broad reading of subparagraph (a) of the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause, which completely overlooks the limiting phrase 
"arising under the order." 7/ It was contrary to the applicable 
rules of contract interpretation, however, for the Court to have 
accepted this interpretation of the clause because Hazeltinefs 
interpretation intentionally fails to acknowledge or give meaning 
to the phrase "arising under this order," which, as discussed 
below, is a phrase that has a well-established meaning in the field 
2/ Hazeltine contends that this subparagraph of "[t]he 
Disputes Clause only permits disputes that are fnot subject to 
appeal1 pursuant to the Disputes Clause to be decided by a court." 
Hazeltine's Motion to Dismiss at 9. "All other disputes," 
Hazeltine argues, "are required to be settled in accordance with 
the disputes resolution procedure set forth in the Disputes 
Clause." Id. This reading of Subcontract Disputes Clause reads 
out the phrase "arising under this order" which has a specialized 
meaning in the context of government contracting, and which was 
inserted by the parties for the express purpose of limiting the 
scope of the Subcontract Disputes Clause. 
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of government contracts. £/ See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing 
Corp.. 454 F. Supp. 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd. 601 F.2d 609 (2d 
Cir. 1978) (New York law requires interpreting contract so as to 
"make every part of a contract effective"); Looney v. Great 
American Ins. Co.. 71 F.R.D. 211, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) 
("construction which neutralizes any provision of a contract should 
never be adopted"); cf. Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country Club. 13 
Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 928, 929 (1962) (Utah courts may not "add, 
ignore, or discard words in the process" of contract 
interpretation) . 
It is critically important, therefore, to understand the 
significance of the phrase "[a]ny dispute arising under this order" 
as used in paragraph (a) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause. The 
Subcontract Disputes Clause that E-Systems and Hazeltine agreed 
upon is a variation on the "standard" Disputes Clause which has 
long been used in virtually every government contract. Over the 
years, many of the terms and phrases used in this "standard" 
Disputes Clause, including the phrase "arising under the contract 
(or subcontract or order)" have come to have specialized meanings 
within the field of government contracts. Cf. Washington 
Metropolitan Area Trans. Auth. v. Buchart-Horn. Inc.. 886 F.2d 733, 
735 (4th Cir. 1989) (there is "considerable guidance in making that 
determination [as to which disputes fall within the Disputes 
8/ The Subcontract Disputes Clause provides that it shall be 
"governed by law of the state of New York." See Record at 345 
(Complaint at Exhibit III, Contract, Clause No. XXXVIII, para, g.)* 
Accordingly, New York law is cited, where appropriate, on points 
of contract law. 
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clause] for the Dispute clause 'is a standard feature of government 
contracts, and arguments concerning [its] scope and appropriate 
function are not novel, •" citing Rohr Industries v. WMATA. 720 F.2d 
1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
Disputes "arising under a contract" technically do not 
constitute breaches of the contract (which are sometimes referred 
to in government contract parlance as "disputes relating to a 
contract") because they fall within the general scope of the 
contract, are anticipated by the parties in advance of contracting, 
and are meant to be handled under special remedy-granting 
provisions within the contract. 9/ The Courtfs failure to consider 
this specialized meaning of the phrase "arising under this order," 
as it is used in the field of government contracts, in construing 
the meaning of the Subcontract Disputes Clause constitutes 
9/ Whether a change to the contract requirements constitutes 
a "breach" depends upon "what should be regarded as having been 
fairly and reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when 
the contract was entered into." Freund v. United States, 260 U.S. 
60, 63 (1922); Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States. 187 Ct. CI. 269, 
275 (1969) ("The basic standard . . . is whether the modified job 
was essentially the same work the parties had bargained for when 
the contract was awarded. . . . [T]here is a cardinal change if the 
ordered deviations •altered the nature of the thing to be 
constructed.1") E-Systems has alleged that, even though some of 
the individual changes required under the Sxibcontract may be 
susceptible to adjustment under the Subcontract Disputes Clause 
administrative appeals process, the cumulative number and sheer 
magnitude of the changes constitute a "cardinal change" or breach 
of the Subcontract which entitles E-Systems to sue Hazeltine for 
breach of Subcontract in "any court of competent jurisdiction." 
See, e.g. , Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States. 194 Ct. CI. 799 
(1971). 
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reversible error* 10/ See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 202 
(technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning 
when used in a transaction within their technical field). 
The phrase "arising under this contract [or order]/1 when used 
in a Disputes Clause of a government contract or subcontract, has 
a restrictive meaning that is well-established in government 
contract law. United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 
U.S. 394, 407 (1966). In Utah Construction. the Court recognized 
the distinction between a true breach of contract and disputes 
"arising under [the] contract", i.e.. a dispute for which there is 
a pre-established "contract adjustment provision" within the terms 
of the contract that will allow the parties to make an equitable 
adjustment for certain anticipated changes or situations. 384 U.S. 
at 401-02; see also Washington Metropolitan Area Trans. Auth.. 
supra (a disputes clause "concerning a question of fact arising 
10/ Consideration of the way that the phrase "arising under 
the contract" is used in the field of government contracting is no 
different from consideration of evidence of "trade usage" in 
commercial contracting. Under New York law, evidence of trade 
usage is clearly not subject to the "parol evidence rule." See 
N.Y. Com. Code, §§ 1-205, 2-202 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1990) 
(Comment 1 (c) to § 2-202 "definitely rejects" the requirement that 
a court find the language of a contract ambiguous before evidence 
of trade usage may be introduced). In fact, the Uniform Commercial 
Code of New York "specifically requires the written language of the 
parties1 agreement to be construed consistently with applicable 
trade usage." Federal Express Corp. v. Pan American World Airwavs. 
Inc.. 623 F.2d 1297, 1302 (8th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). By 
allowing evidence of course of dealing and trade usage, the court 
merely places the contract in the context in which it was executed. 
As aptly noted in Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 
F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971) (dispute over standby and 
subordination agreements), w[c]ertainly the parol evidence rule 
does not preclude evidence of the course of dealings or usage of 
trade, for such evidence merely delineates a commercial backdrop 
for intelligent interpretation of the agreement." 
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under this contract.'1 • . . merely establishes an] administrative 
procedure for resolving quarrels. Other contractual provisions, 
by granting a contract administrator authority to afford some 
remedy for the quarrel must in effect confer jurisdiction)? 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Grace Line. Inc., 416 F.2d 1096# 1102-03 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) ("That phrase — •arising under this contract1 -
- has a lengthy history, throughout which it has commanded 
widespread acceptance as an unyielding limitation on administrative 
reference to disputes that can be fully remedied under some 
stipulation of contract . . . . [However, resort to the disputes 
clause procedure need not be made] unless [the claim] is subject 
to full administrative vindication under some other provision of 
the contracts.ff). 
Hazeltine incorrectly asserted below that the advent of the 
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 ("CDA") rendered obsolete or 
"abolished" the well-established distinction between disputes 
"arising under" and disputes "related to" a contract (the latter 
constituting actions for breach). See Record at 610-12 
(Hazeltine1s Reply Memorandum at 7 - 9). Hazeltinefs contention 
is untrue. 11/ 
11/ Prior to enactment of the CDA, the distinction between 
disputes "arising under" the contract and disputes involving breach 
of contract was determinative of the jurisdiction of the agency 
boards of contract appeal (these boards had jurisdiction to 
consider disputes "arising under" the contract, but could not 
consider breach of contract claims). The CDA, inter alia, expanded 
the jurisdiction of the agency boards of contract appeal to hear 
both kinds of disputes and this change was subsequently reflected 
in the standard government contracts disputes clause. The CDA also 
requires the contractor to submit all claims, including breach 
claims, to the government contracting officer for a final decision. 
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The specialized definitions of the phrases "arising under a 
contract" and "related to a contract," as used in the context of 
government contract law certainly have not been "abolished" by the 
CDA. In fact, the "arising under" versus "related to" distinction 
survives in the current version of FAR 52.233-1 "Disputes" (Apr. 
1984), the Disputes Clause that is required by federal regulation 
to be used in virtually all government prime contracts. 12/ See 
FAR §§ 33.203 & 33.214 (text of FAR § 52.233-1 "Disputes" is 
contained in the Record at 707-08 (E-Systemsf Supplemental 
Memorandum, Exhibit H)). 
Government contractors still rely heavily on the "arising 
under" versus "related to" distinction in paragraph (h) of FAR § 
52.233-1 Disputes, which sets forth the contractor's obligation to 
proceed with contract work pending a dispute. This paragraph 
states "[t]he Contractor shall proceed diligently with performance 
of the contract, pending final resolution of any request for 
relief, claim, or appeal or action arising under the contract, and 
Since the passage of the CDA, the nature of a dispute has been less 
frequently litigated (simply because both types of disputes are 
handled in essentially the same way and the boards of contract 
appeal no longer have to consider the nature of this dispute before 
asserting jurisdiction over the dispute). As discussed below, 
however, the distinction between the disputes "arising ixnder" and 
disputes "relating to" a contract remains important. 
12/ Hazeltine argued below that the FAA's alleged breach of 
Hazeltine's contract did not permit Hazeltine to "ignore the 
disputes resolution procedures of the prime contract." See Record 
at 644, (Hazeltine's Reply Brief at n.7). This argument 
conveniently overlooks the fact that the disputes provision in the 
FAA-Hazeltine contract expressly applies to "all disputes arising 
under or relating to" the contract, see Record at 710, while the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause only applies to "disputes arising under 
this order." In short, Hazeltine is comparing apples to oranges. 
26 
comply with any decision of the Contracting Officer." This 
language allows a contractor to stop work if the dispute involves 
a breach of contract by the Government. 13/ 
If the Government has a compelling need to require the 
Contractor to proceed even when the Government breaches the 
contract, then the FAR directs the use of "Alternate I" to the 
Disputes Clause. Alternate I simply modifies paragraph (h) of the 
Disputes Clause to require the Contractor to proceed pending final 
resolution of any dispute "arising under or related to" the 
13/ The official comments published with the final, post-CDA 
version of the Disputes Clause included the following: 
A major change from the regulations and interim Disputes 
clause, in use since March 1979, concerns the extent of 
the contractor's obligation to continue performance of 
work. Prior to the passage of the Contract Disputes Act, 
a contractor, pursuant to the Disputes clause then in 
effect, was in the event of a dispute arising under the 
contract, obligated to continue performance in accordance 
with the contracting officer's decision pending 
resolution of the dispute. On the other hand, if the 
dispute arose out of the contract, or in breach of the 
contract, there was no obligation to continue work. The 
interim Disputes clause expanded the contractor's 
obligation to continue performance to include disputes 
arising out of, or in breach of, the contract as well as 
under the contract. The final Disputes clause published 
here returns the situation to the pre-Contract Disputes 
Act obligation. Under the Disputes clause and the 
accompanying regulations, the contractor is obligated to 
continue work only if the dispute arises under the 
contract. It is recognized, however, that in unusual 
circumstances the performance of some contracts may be 
vital to the national security or public health and 
welfare so that performance must be guaranteed even in 
the event of a dispute arising out of, or in breach of, 
contract. In these unusual cases, procuring agencies may 
provide for a change to the Disputes clause to assure 
continuation of the work. 
45 Fed. Reg. 31035 (May 9, 1980). 
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contract. Record at 706-08 (FAR 33.214 & FAR 52.233-1, Alternate 
I). Thus, the obligations placed on a government contractor vary 
significantly depending upon whether the Disputes Clause employs 
the phrase "arising under or related to11 or simply "arising under 
the contract." 
Despite its arguments to the contrary, this important 
distinction is not lost upon Hazeltine. The disputes provision in 
Hazeltinefs contract with the FAA does not invoke "Alternate I," 
but only requires Hazeltine to "proceed diligently" with contract 
performance pending resolution of disputes arising under the FAA 
contract. See Record at 688, 710 (E-Systems' Supplemental Brief 
at 5 & Exhibit I). Faced with what it considered to be a no-win 
situation under the prime contract, Hazeltine has attempted to 
invoke its right to stop work under the prime contract by arguing 
that the FAA breached the contract so as to relieve Hazeltine of 
its obligation to proceed under the Disputes Clause. See Record 
at 674 (Hazeltine's Reply Brief at Exhibit A, Complaint in 
Hazeltine v. United States at 5 183). Given Hazeltine1s position 
vis-a-vis the FAA, where Hazeltine is asserting that it does not 
have to proceed with work on the prime contract because its dispute 
with the FAA does not "arise under the contract," it is remarkable 
that Hazeltine would even suggest that the distinction between 
disputes "arising under" a contract and disputes "related to" a 
contract has been "abolished" for the purposes of government 
contract law. 
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In sum, if the object of the parties was to draft the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause to govern breaches of the Subcontract, 
they needed only to invoke the phrase "arising under or related to 
the order11 in place of the phrase that, in fact, was agreed upon-
- "arising under this order.11 As a consequence of the parties1 
choice of the more restrictive phrase "arising under the order" in 
lieu of the all-inclusive phrase "arising under or relating to the 
order," E-Systems' claims based upon breach of the Subcontract are 
simply not subject to the administrative appeals procedure set 
forth in the Subcontract Disputes Clause. 
2. E-Systems, in the Alternative, Raised the 
Possibility of More Than One Reasonable 
Interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes 
Clause, Thereby Precluding Application of the 
Parol Evidence Rule. 
The interpretation of the clause explained in the preceding 
section is obviously not the same interpretation adopted by the 
Court below, but it is a reasonable one. At the very least, then, 
the parties' use of the phrase "arising under the order" to modify 
"any disputes" in paragraph (a) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause 
raises the possibility of more than one reasonable interpretation 
of the Subcontract Disputes Clause, i.e.. an ambiguity. See Walk-
In Medical Centers. Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp.. 818 F.2d 260, 
263 (2d Cir. 1987) (Under New York law, H[a]n •ambiguous1 word or 
phrase is one capable of more than one meaning when viewed 
objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined 
the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is 
cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as 
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generally understood in the particular trade or business," quoting 
Eskimo Pie Corp, v. Whitelawn Dairies. Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 994 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)); IBM Pouahkeepsie Employees Federal Credit Union 
v. Cumis Insurance Society. Inc.. 590 F. Supp. 769, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (if contract term is susceptible to "at least two fairly 
reasonable meanings,11 then parol evidence is permitted). 
By failing to acknowledge even this much, the Court below 
compounded its error by failing to consider all evidence that E-
Systems proffered regarding the intent of the parties with respect 
to the scope of the Subcontract Disputes Clause. There is no 
question that E-Systems submitted evidence sufficient to raise a 
material issue of fact regarding whether the phrase "arising under 
this order" was used intentionally by the parties for the express 
purpose of limiting the application of the Subcontract Disputes 
Clause. See, e.g. . Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1975) (only one sworn statement is necessary to dispute averments 
on the other side and to preclude summary judgment). 
As evidence supporting its contention that the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause was crafted to apply only to disputes falling 
short of breaches of the Subcontract (i.e.. only disputes "arising 
under the order"), E-Systems introduced affidavits of two of its 
employees, Gary L. Hopkins, Associate General Counsel for 
E-Systems, and Rodger M. Brimhall, E-Systems1 Senior Contracts 
Administrator, both of whom actually participated in the 
negotiations with Hazeltine over the wording of the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause. Both men attested to the fact that the language 
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ultimately agreed upon indeed was intended to restrict the 
application of the disputes resolution procedure to only those 
disputes "arising under the order" as that phrase is customarily 
applied in the context of government contracting. 
Mr. Hopkins1 affidavit states: 
The disputes article was structured to cover those 
claims "arising under" the subcontract as that 
terminology is used in Federal contracting. 
Further, with respect to such claims, namely those 
arising under the contract, only those claims caused 
by some direction, change or other action of the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) through 
Hazeltine to E-Systems were to be subject to the 
applicable provisions outlined in subparagraphs (b) 
through (e) of ARTICLE XXXVIII. 
See Record at 579-80, Affidavit of Gary L. Hopkins, Brief in 
Opposition at Exhibit B at paragraph 3. 
Mr Brimhall1 s affidavit corroborates E-Systems' interpretation 
of the Subcontract Disputes Clause: 
During negotiations over the subcontract, an issue 
arose regarding the scope of Hazeltinefs proposed 
"Disputes" clause. That issue was ultimately 
resolved by Hazeltine1s and E-Systems1 agreement to 
use a non-standard disputes clause that was intended 
to set up a procedure for the resolution of disputes 
"arising under" the subcontract, as that phrase is 
applied in traditional government contracts. 
Subcontract K25213, Art. XXXVIII (a). All other 
disputes between E-Systems and Hazeltine were not 
intended to be subject to the government contracts 
appeals procedure and could be asserted as claims 
in "any court of competent jurisdiction." Id. 
See Record at 553 (E-Systemsf Brief in Opposition, Exhibit A, 
Affidavit of Rodger M. Brimhall, at paragraph 5). In sum, both 
Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Brimhall recall that Hazeltine and E-Systems 
used the phrase "arising under" the Subcontract to limit scope of 
disputes subject to the administrative appeals procedure. 
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As is demonstrated above, these recollections are entirely 
consistent with the way that the phrase "arising under" the 
contract or subcontract is typically used, and continues to be 
used, in disputes provisions in government contracting. Moreover, 
had E-Systems been provided with even a limited opportunity to 
conduct discovery in this case, it is certain that E-Systems could 
have provided even more support for its contention that E-Systems 
and Hazeltine, both experienced government contractors, intended 
to use those "terms of art" in a manner consistent with their 
understanding of those terms in the context of government contract 
law. 
3. The E-Systems1 Claims Do Not "Arise Under" the 
Subcontract Because the Remedy-Granting Provisions 
in the Subcontract Cannot Adequately Address Those 
Claims. 
a. The Subcontract's Remedy-Granting Provisions 
Are Very Limited in Scope. 
The claims asserted by E-Systems in Utah court are breach 
claims that do not "arise under the order" because they clearly are 
not susceptible to complete relief under any "remedy-granting" 
clause in the Subcontract. While E-Systems concedes that there 
are remedy-granting clauses in the Subcontract, including the 
"Changes" clause (see Record at 305, Subcontract K25213, Standard 
Form 32, Clause No. 2), the "equitable adjustments" contemplated 
by that clause only extend to Government-directed, in-scope changes 
to the specifications, changes in place of delivery or method of 
shipment. It is patently evident that E-Systemsf allegations of 
out-of-scope changes to the Subcontract requirements, bad faith and 
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breach of contract relating both to the Subcontract and the Teaming 
Agreement are far broader than the limited types of matters that 
reasonably can be addressed by this narrowly drawn clause or the 
remedies available under that or other Subcontract clauses. 
The "Termination for Convenience" clause in the Subcontract 
also fails to address in a meaningful way E-Systems' claims for 
breach of the Subcontract and the Teaming Agreement. Like the 
"Changes" clause, the "Termination for Convenience" clause has a 
limited purpose and it cannot be used by a prime contractor as an 
all-purpose shield against subcontractor claims for breach of 
Subcontract. See, e.g., Roaerson Aircraft Corp. v. Fairchild 
Indus. . Inc. . 632 F. Supp. 1494 (CD. Cal. 1986) (applying New York 
law to allow breach damages for anticipatory lost profits relating 
to a sales contract to supply aircraft parts notwithstanding fact 
that contract contained a termination for convenience clause). In 
Roaerson Aircraft, the court held that the termination provisions 
of the contract were structured to "force Fairchild to elect either 
to terminate . . . the contract for its convenience . . . thereby 
requiring a speedy close-out of the contract and the payment of 
Rogerson's termination costs and settlement expenses . . . or to 
terminate the contract for default." 632 F. Supp. at 1499. The 
court held that Fairchild's wrongful termination for default 
constituted a breach of the contract and prevented Fairchild from 
limiting damages to those available under the termination for 
convenience clause, id. (citing Klein v. United States, 285 F.2d 
778 (Ct. CI. 1961)). Similarly, Hazeltine has abused any rights 
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it had under the Termination for Convenience clause by failing — 
for nearly two years — to provide for the "speedy close-out of the 
contract and the payment of [E-Systemsf] termination costs and 
settlement expenses" under the Subcontract. Consequently/ E-
Systems right to recovery against Hazeltine cannot be limited only 
to that which E-Systems would have obtained under that clause. 
b. E-Systems Is Entitled to Recover Damages for 
Breach of the Subcontract and the Teaming 
Agreement That Are Unavailable Under Any 
Remedy-Granting Provision of the Subcontract, 
Under generally accepted principles of contract law and New 
York contract law in particular, E-Systems is entitled to recover 
its "reliance damages" for Hazeltine1s breach of the Subcontract 
and the Teaming Agreement. Reliance damages are damages for 
amounts which plaintiff "has been induced to expend on the faith 
of the contract, including a fair allowance for his own time and 
services." United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 345 (1884). 
Reliance damages encompass any expenditures made on the part of the 
plaintiff "in 'essential reliance1 upon defendant's promise," 
Gruber v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442, 446 (S.D.N.Y 1954), 
including expenditures in preparation for and partial performance 
of the contract. See, e.g.. Freund v. Washington Square Press, 
Inc. . 34 N.Y.2d 379, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (1974); gee also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 (1981) (reasonable 
expenditures in necessary preparation or partial performance of 
contract recoverable); 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1031 (1964 & Supp. 
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1990) (fl[e]xpenditures in preparation and part performance are 
recoverable as an alternative means of gains prevented"). 14/ 
E-Systems was induced to spend substantial sums in essential 
reliance upon Hazeltinefs broken promises made under both the 
Subcontract and the Teaming Agreement — amounts which cannot be 
recovered in an administrative appeal to the FAA. E-Systems has 
expended approximately $11,579,000 in contract design and 
development, $893,000 in building 10 DME/P first article units; 
$6,167,000 in building production DME/P systems and related spares. 
Due to Hazeltine's abandonment of the Subcontract, these costs 
might not be recovered if Hazeltine is unsuccessful in litigation 
against the FAA over the propriety of the default termination. 
Other costs that E-Systems expended in reliance on Hazeltine's 
good faith performance of the Subcontract and Teaming Agreement 
that cannot be recovered through an administrative appeal even if 
Hazeltine succeeds at overturning its default termination, 
including $1,125,000 in pre-contract development costs, $2,318,000 
in company-funded design and development, $680,000 in unabsorbed 
burden/overhead, $231,000 in attorneys fees, and additional intra-
company expenses associated with E-Systemsf attempts to work its 
way out of the problems that Hazeltine created by its outright 
repudiation of the Subcontract. 
14/Additionally, if the Court finds, as the facts indicate, 
that Hazeltine acted in bad faith, Hazeltine will be estopped from 
asserting any contractual limitation on consequential damages, and 
E-Systems will be entitled to recover lost profits as well. See, 
e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Selaval. 646 F. 
Supp. 1442, 1458 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) and cases cited therein. 
35 
Moreover, because Hazeltine has failed to properly terminate 
and close out the contract, E-Systems has been forced to absorb the 
carrying cost of the entire Subcontract inventory for a period 
approaching two years. This interest expense is $2,675,000 and 
growing, and it is not recoverable from the Government under the 
termination for convenience that Hazeltine now seeks in U.S. Claims 
Court. See, e.g., United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 
329 U.S. 585 (1947) (interest may not be assessed against the 
government unless permitted by statute or contract provision); FAR 
31.205-20 "Interest and other financial costs" (interest 
unallowable cost under government contracts); FAR 31.205-42 
"Termination costs" (cost principles in FAR Subpart 31.2 applicable 
to termination situations). 
Consequently, if E-Systems were to pursue the administrative 
appeals process and seek reimbursement under the remedy-granting 
clauses of the Subcontract, any remedy under such clauses clearly 
would be insufficient to address E-Systems' damages for breach of 
Subcontract and Teaming Agreement. Because E-Systems has alleged 
both a breach of the Subcontract and breach of the Teaming 
Agreement and can demonstrate its breach damages are unavailable 
under the any remedy-granting clause in the Subcontract, the Court 
below was incorrect to require E-Systems to first pursue an 
administrative remedy prior to seeking relief in the Utah court. 
E-Systems is clearly entitled to recover all its reliance 
damages resulting from Hazeltine's abandonment of the Subcontract 
and Teaming Agreement not just those that are theoretically 
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"available" under the remedy-granting provisions of the 
Subcontract. As the Court said in United States v. Behan. 110 U.S. 
338 (1884): 
It does not lie, however, in the mouth of the party, 
who has voluntarily and wrongfully put an end to the 
contract, to say that the party injured has not been 
damaged at least to the amount of what he has been 
induced fairly and in good faith to lay out and 
expend (including his own services) . . . . 
Id. at 345. As the Behan Court further stated, "the wilful and 
wrongful putting an end to a contract, and preventing the other 
party from carrying it out, is itself a breach of contract for 
which an action will lie for the recovery of all damages which the 
injured party sustained." Id. at 346 (emphasis added); see also 
Polyalvcoat v. C.P.C. Distributors. Inc.. 534 F. Supp. 200, 203 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiff entitled to recover sums spent 
advertising products in reliance upon subsequently breached 
contract); Mefer S.A.R.L. of Paris v. Naviaaro Maritime. 533 F. 
Supp. 337, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiff entitled to recover 
"foreseeable losses and expenses" incurred as a result of 
defendant's breach). 
In sum, Hazeltine has improperly invoked the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause to further delay E-Systems' recovery of the sums 
that E-Systems expended in reliance upon Hazeltine's broken 
promises under the Subcontract and Teaming Agreement. By accepting 
Hazeltine's overly-broad interpretation of the Subcontract Disputes 
Clause, the Court below not only misapplied the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause, it inadvertently abetted Hazeltine's delaying 
tactics by wrongly directing E-Systems to pursue an administrative 
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remedy that was both inapplicable and incapable of providing E-
Systems complete relief. 
4. Even Under Hazeltine!s Interpretation of the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause, the Claims Asserted By 
E-Systems Against Hazeltine Are Not "Subject to 
Appeal" Under the Administrative Appeals Procedure. 
Putting aside the question of whether the clause only modifies 
E-Systems1 right to resort to the Utah courts for disputes "arising 
under the order," the Court's rulings below cannot even be 
supported based upon Hazeltine!s proffered interpretation of the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause. Hazeltine ignores the phrase 
"arising under the order" and reads paragraph (a) of the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause to mean that only those claims "not 
subject to appeal . . . shall be heard by any court of competent 
jurisdiction." See Record 407 (Hazeltine1s Brief at 9) (emphasis 
added). 
In adopting Hazeltine's interpretation of the Subcontract 
Disputes Clause, the Court erred by failing to examine each of E-
Systems1 claims to determine whether those claims were, in fact, 
actually "subject to appeal" to the FAA Contracting Officer. Since 
the FAA Contracting Officer only has authority to rule on disputes 
resulting from FAA action, the Court below should have determined 
whether the claims asserted by E-Systems in Utah court resulted 
from FAA action. This is a question that is not capable of 
determination as a matter of law. 
The administrative appeals process set forth in paragraphs 
(b) through (e) of the Subcontract Disputes Clause anticipates that 
the FAA Contracting Officer will issue a final decision on the 
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merits of the dispute which, in turn, may be appealed to either the 
Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals ("DOTBCA") 
or the U.S. Claims Court, the category of disputes that are 
"subject to appeal" necessarily can be no broader than the 
authority of the FAA Contracting Officer to render such decisions 
or the DOTBCA's or U.S. Claims Court's jurisdiction to consider 
related appeals. 
The applicable section of the federal regulations 
circumscribing the Contracting Officer's ability to render final 
decisions on disputes involving subcontractors, set forth at FAR 
44.203 (c), reads as follows: 
Contracting officers should not refuse consent to 
a subcontract merely because it contains a clause 
giving the subcontractor the right of indirect 
appeal to an agency board of contract appeals if the 
subcontractor is affected by a dispute between the 
Government and the prime contractor. Indirect 
appeal means assertion by the subcontractor of the 
prime contractor's right to appeal or the 
prosecution of an appeal by the prime contractor on 
the subcontractor's behalf. This clause may also 
provide that the prime contractor and the 
subcontractor shall be equally bound by the 
contracting officer's or board's decision. The 
clause may not attempt to obligate the contracting 
officer or the appeals board to decide questions 
that do not arise between the Government and the 
prime contractor or that are not cognizable under 
the clause at § 53.233-1, Disputes. 
The above regulation clearly limits the types of disputes 
"subject to appeal." In fact, the Subcontract may not purport to 
require the Contracting Officer to render decisions on any prime 
contractor/subcontractor disputes unless that dispute "arise[s] 
between the Government and the prime contractor," i.e., stems from 
government action which affects the contractor or results from a 
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dispute between the prime contractor and the government. 15/ Cf. 
Grumman Ohio Corp. v, Dole. 776 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(incorporation of the standard government disputes clause in 
subcontract does not impose on the Urban Mass Transportation 
Administration any obligation to provide a forum for disputes 
involving a contract to which it is not a party; "it makes no sense 
whatever in the real world to force UMTA to preside over battles 
in which the federal interests are minimal at best.1'). 
Although E-Systems1 claims for recurring and nonrecurring 
costs under the Subcontract, in the main, resulted from direction 
of the FAA and are arguably "subject to appeal" in the sense that 
they are claims for which the FAA may ultimately be liable, 16/ 
E-Systems has leveled allegations of specific acts of bad faith and 
breach of contract by Hazeltine that cannot, in good faith, 
reasonably be attributed to the direction of the FAA. For such 
claims, resort to the administrative appeals procedure, which 
entails E-Systems seeking recovery from the FAA, would serve no 
15/ Likewise, the U.S. Claims Court has no jurisdiction to 
consider such prime contractor/subcontractor disputes. £f. Rolls-
Royce, Ltd.. Derby. England v. United States. 364 F.2d 415 (Ct. CI. 
1966) (Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over breach of contract 
counterclaim by third party intervenor against private plaintiff, 
even though the counterclaim involved common questions of fact, 
because it did not seek to enforce a claim that was part of the 
plaintiff's original action against the United States). 
16/ As previously noted, however, the cumulative effect of 
the changes went far beyond the original scope of the Subcontract 
and thereby constitute a cardinal change to, and thus a breach of, 
the Subcontract. See, e.g., Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United 
States. 173 Ct. CI. 180 (1965). As explained above, E-Systems is 
entitled, under the Subcontract Disputes Clause, to have its breach 
claims heard in "any court of competent jurisdiction." 
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purpose other than to delay E-Systems1 recovery from Hazeltine for 
its valid claims against Hazeltine. 
Perhaps the clearest indication of error on the part of the 
Court below was its failure to recognize E-Systems' right to 
proceed against Hazeltine in Utah court to recover that portion of 
E-Systems1 two separate claims for nonrecurring and recurring costs 
which Hazeltine refused to certify and submit to the Contracting 
Officer pursuant to subparagraphs (b) through (e) of the 
Subcontract Disputes Clause. Even Hazeltine was not prepared to 
certify to the FAA that portion of the claim was "subject to 
appeal." 
Other clear examples of disputes "not subject to appeal" are 
E-Systems1 claims relating to Hazeltine's breach of the Teaming 
Agreements, dated December 7, 1982 and December 21, 1987. These 
Teaming Agreements are independent contracts that have no disputes 
clause, do not contain any other provision purporting to require 
that disputes relating to the Teaming Agreement be resolved in any 
predetermined manner, and do not expressly or impliedly incorporate 
the Subcontract Disputes Clause. 17/ 
17/ Hazeltine has argued that E-Systems1 claims based upon 
breach of the Teaming Agreements should be dismissed because, 
"although [these] counts are superficially based on the 1985 
Teaming Agreement, they specifically related to claims arising 
under the Subcontract." See Record at 412 (Hazeltinefs Brief in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 14, n.2) E-Systems has alleged 
that its incurred significant expenses, including over $1 million 
in pre-contract design and development expenses, in reliance on 
Hazeltinefs promises under the Teaming Agreement. This claim is 
not "superficially" based upon any claim "arising under" the 
Subcontract. 
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B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding, As a Matter of Law, 
That the Subcontract Disputes Clause Had Not Failed of 
Its Essential Purpose Because That Determination 
Inherently Involves Questions of Fact. 
Even if the Subcontract Disputes Clause can reasonably be read 
to apply to the claims raised by E-Systems below, the court below 
was incorrect to force E-Systems to pursue an administrative appeal 
with the FAA because the Subcontract Disputes Clause has "failed 
of its essential purpose," which is to allow for an expeditious 
administrative disposition of those disputes "arising under the 
order" in the course of Subcontract performance. Cf. United States 
v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc.. 857 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(disputes clause presupposes an on-going contractual relationship 
and specific contractual remedies). 18/ 
The New York contract law doctrine of "failure of essential 
purpose" relieves a party from pursuing an otherwise exclusive or 
limited remedy if the circumstances existing at the time of the 
agreement have changed to such a degree that the enforcement of the 
remedy would deprive the plaintiff of a substantial benefit of that 
remedy. 19/ In such cases, the limited remedy is simply 
18/ It is irrelevant that the disputes clause survives 
"completion." 
19/ Under government contract law, a similar exception to 
the contractor's obligation to proceed under the Disputes clause 
exists where the contractor alleges that the government has 
essentially deprived the contractor of the administrative appeals 
process. See J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. City of Dover v. 
General Electric Co., 372 A.2d 540 (Del. Super. 1977); Patton 
Wrecking & Demolition Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 465 F.2d 
1073 (5th Cir. 1972) ("It may be that the contracting officer . . 
. so clearly reveals an unwillingness to act to comply with the 
administrative procedures in the contract that the contractor or 
supplier is justified in concluding that the procedures thereby 
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disregarded and the full arsenal of breach remedies becomes 
available to the plaintiff. See, e.g.. Computerized Radiological 
Services. Inc. v. Svntex Corp,. 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1510 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984) , aff'd in part and rev'd in part. 768 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1986) , 
citing Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Ltd.. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 
404-05, 244 N.E.2d 685, 688, 97 N.Y.S.2d 108, 113 (1968). 
There is no question that Hazeltinefs bad faith acts work to 
deny E-Systems a substantial benefit of the administrative appeals 
process. 20/ The paramount impediment to E-Systems1 recovery under 
the administrative appeals process stems from Hazeltine's election 
to stop work under the prime contract — a decision which directly 
precipitated the FAA!s termination for default of the prime 
have become 'unavailable'.") Cf. Rohr Industries. 720 F.2d at 1323 
(contractor's claim for breach of contract based upon failure to 
comply with disputes clause did not have to be processed through 
disputes clause procedure). 
20/ Hazeltine's bad faith conduct alone precludes it from 
asserting any rights under the Subcontract Disputes Clause even if 
that clause does not lffail of its essential purpose11 because 
•• 'persons invoking the aid of contracts are under an implied 
obligation to exercise good faith not to frustrate the contracts 
into which they have entered.11' See Lowell v. Twin Disc. Inc. . 
527 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing Grad v. Roberts, 14 N.Y.2d 70, 
75, 248 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637, 198 N.E.2d 26, 28 (1964)). E-Systems 
has alleged facts sufficient to make a prima facie claim that 
Hazeltine has breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing of both the Subcontract and the Teaming Agreement. This 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is present in all 
contracts, is a promise not to act so as to deprive the other party 
of the benefits of the contract. See, e.g.. Kirke La Shelle Co. 
v. Paul Armstrong Co.. 263 N.Y. 79, 104 N.E. 163 (1933). 
Hazeltine's willful deviation from the terms of the Subcontract, 
therefore, should preclude it from attempting to enforce any 
provision in that Subcontract. See, e.g.. Filner v. Shapiro. 633 
F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law to preclude 
application of doctrine of substantial performance due to willful 
breach of contract by defendant). 
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contract. Although Hazeltine is attempting in the U.S. Claims 
Court to have the termination for default converted into a 
termination for convenience, until this is accomplished the 
administrative appeals procedure is essentially foreclosed. 21/ 
With only a few exceptions, a contractor is not entitled to payment 
for undelivered work under a defaulted contract. See, e.g.. Jules 
Teitelbaum. Trustee in Bankruptcy for Victory Electronics. Inc.. 
ASBCA No. 12885, 70-1 BCA \ 8210 at 38,164, 38,175 (defaulted 
contractor not entitled to equitable adjustment for additional 
testing of radio sets because the testing was incomplete and 
undelivered at time of default termination); Tuff-Kote Dinol. J.P. 
Partiridae, Inc.. ASBCA Nos. 28961, 30058, 87-3 BCA 5 20,042 at 
101,462—101,463 ("general rule is that where a contract has been 
properly terminated for default, no recovery may be had for the 
expenses of either changed or unchanged work incurred prior to 
termination with respect to undelivered supplies or services"). 
Hazeltine argued below that if it is successful in convincing 
the U.S. Claims Court to reverse the FAAfs decision to terminate 
the prime contract for default, E-Systems then may avail itself of 
the administrative appeals process. Record at 617. If it is not 
21/ Hazeltine argued below that E-Systems should not be 
allowed to disregard the administrative appeals process because it 
would expose Hazeltine to the "disastrous" possibility of 
inconsistent judgments, [cites] E-Systems has the right to prove 
breach of the Subcontract by Hazeltine and to recover its damages 
from Hazeltine. If Hazeltine can prove that its breach of the 
Subcontract resulted from FAA actions and, in turn, recover from 
the FAA, then that is good for Hazeltine. If it cannot recover 
from the FAA, however, E-Systems is still entitled to compensation 
from Hazeltine for Hazeltine1s breach of the Subcontract. In short 
there is no real possibility of "inconsistent judgments." 
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successful, E-Systems can later file suit against Hazeltine in the 
Utah courts and later seek the same remedy it seeks now. 22J Given 
these alternatives, Hazeltine disingenuously suggests that E-
Systems1 rights under the disputes clause are Mnot affected fit 
all.11 Id. The point of the doctrine of "failure of essential 
purpose/1 however, must relate to the actual intent of the parties 
regarding the purpose of the clause, and in this case the purpose 
of the clause was to provide an expeditious remedy in the context 
of an on-going contractual relationship. No matter what the 
outcome of Hazeltine!s litigation in U.S. Claims Court, that 
purpose has been frustrated. 
Under the doctrine of frustration of essential purpose, the 
central question is whether ,Man exclusive remedy, which may have 
appeared fair and reasonable at the inception of the contract, as 
a result of later circumstances operates to deprive a party of a 
substantial benefit,'11 and under New York law a substantial delay 
in supplying a remedy can iust as effectively deny the benefit of 
a remedy as a total inability to provide the remedy. See, e.g., 
Cayuga Harvester v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation. 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 
611, 95 A.D.2d 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
Whether Hazeltinefs actions deprived E-Systems of a 
substantial benefit of its agreement is a question of fact which 
precludes summary judgment. In Cayuga Harvester, the court 
22/ It may take several years before the U.S. Claims Court 
renders a decision on Hazeltine's action against the FAA. 
Hazeltine overlooks the fact that the statute of limitations may 
bar subsequent action by E-Systems at that time. 
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reversed a summary judgment on the issue of whether a "repair or 
replace" remedy clause failed of its essential purpose. The court 
stated, "ordinarily, whether circumstances have caused a flimited 
remedy to fail of its essential purpose1 is a question of fact for 
the jury and one necessarily to be resolved when proof of the 
circumstances occurring after the contract is formed." The court 
held that the plaintiff's allegations of delay constituted a prima 
facie showing that the remedy clause failed of its essential 
purpose, even absent bad faith or wilfully dilatory conduct on the 
part of the defendant. Cayuga Harvester. 465 N.Y.S.2d at 611-12; 
see also Erie County Water Auth. v. Hen-Gar Constr. Corp., 473 F. 
Supp. 1315 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (New York failure of essential purpose 
doctrine depends upon whether party is deprived of the substantial 
value of its bargain; this is a question of fact which precludes 
summary judgment). 
Hazeltine cannot dispute the fact that its termination for 
default imposes a substantial delay on the administrative process. 
If Hazeltine is not successful in reversing the termination for 
default, it will possibly foreclose the administrative appeals 
process altogether. Even if Hazeltine is ultimately successful in 
reversing its termination for default, however, E-Systems still may 
not obtain any benefit from the administrative appeals process 
because the FAA had raised affirmative defenses against Hazeltine 
that, if successful, may bar any recovery by E-Systems. See Record 
at 664 (Defendants1 Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, 
filed October 20, 1989, at para. 189, Hazeltine Corp. v. United 
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States, No. 425-89C (CI. Ct. Aug. 9, 1989) (FAA asserts that 
Hazeltine's claims against the FAA are barred by estoppel, waiver, 
release, or accord and satisfaction)). 
In light of Hazeltine!s absolute repudiation of the 
Subcontract, Hazeltine's termination for default, and the FAAfs 
claim to affirmative defenses against any claims asserted by 
Hazeltine, the administrative appeals process that Mmay have 
appeared fair and reasonable at the inception of the contract" 
certainly no longer appears fair and reasonable. At a minimum, the 
Court below erred in failing to allow E-Systems to show, as a 
factual matter, that Hazeltine1s bad faith conduct had made the 
remedy too difficult to achieve. See Tareyton Electronic 
Composition, Inc. v. Eltra Corp.. 21 U.C.C. Rep. 1064 (M.D.N.C. 
1977) (New York law precludes summary judgment where party alleging 
breach of contract is seeking to avoid the exclusive or limited 
remedy; plaintiff entitled to show the defendant's own bad faith 
act that precludes recovery under that limited remedy). 
C. The Trial Court Improperly Denied E-Systems Its 
Rightful Choice of Forum by Failing to Consider a 
Stay of E-Systems1 Action Pending the Determination 
Under the Administrative Appeals Procedure. 
The Court below dismissed E-Systems1 claims for breach of the 
Subcontract and Teaming Agreement because in the Court's view E-
Systems had not complied with the administrative appeals procedure 
of the Subcontract Disputes Clause. See Conclusion of Law No. 4. 
("Exhaustion of the appeal procedure . . . is a condition precedent 
to initiation by E-Systems of this litigation against Hazeltine.") . 
E-Systems is unable to submit its claims against Hazeltine to the 
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FAA for determination under the administrative appeals procedure 
because such an appeal would require that E-Systems certify that 
nthe amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment 
for which the contractor believes the Government is liable." See 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 33.207. Pending this appeal, 
however, E-Systems has submitted to the FAA its claims for 
recurring and non-recurring costs based upon FAA-directed changes 
to the Subcontract, and these claims are currently pending in the 
U.S. Claims Court. Even if E-Systems recovers on these claims, 
however, E-Systems will not be made whole for Hazeltine's breach 
of the Subcontract and Teaming Agreement. 
Whether this Court decides that E-Systems should first proceed 
with all or part of its claims through the administrative appeal 
procedure, E-Systems should be allowed to retain its choice of 
forum in the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County for all 
claims not resolved by the administrative appeals procedure. 
Pursuant to Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this Court may "modify or otherwise dispose of any order of 
judgment appealed from." This matter should be reversed and 
allowed to proceed in the Third Judicial District Court. However, 
in the event that this Court affirms the decision of the trial 
court, the trial court's order should be modified to stay the 
present action by E-Systems in order to preserve E-Systems1 choice 
of forum pending the resolution of any administrative appeal. 
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VIII. CQNCIffglOy 
Instead of allowing E-Systems to proceed with its breach of 
contract action in the Utah courts, the Court below misconstrued 
a "Disputes" clause in the Subcontract to require that E-Systems 
pursue an administrative appeal to seek recovery for its breach of 
contract damages from the FAA as a prerequisite to E-Systems' 
instituting an action against Hazeltine in the Utah courts. There 
is absolutely no basis under the express terms of the Subcontract, 
or under any other legal principle, for this conclusion. 
First, the Disputes clause in question expressly does not 
apply to breaches of the Subcontract. Second, even if it did 
purport to cover such claims, E-Systems1 claims in the Utah court 
concern its dispute with Hazeltine, not any dispute between the FAA 
and Hazeltine that, in turn, affects the Subcontract. Under the 
New York contract law which governs the Subcontract, E-Systems is 
entitled to reliance damages for breach of the Subcontract and the 
Teaming Agreement including pre-contract development costs, 
inventory carrying costs, and other damages not otherwise 
recoverable from the FAA. This remedy is unavailable under the 
administrative procedure contemplated in the Disputes clause. It 
makes no sense to force E-Systems to go through the motions of 
complying with an administrative disputes process that E-Systems 
can now show will be insufficient to remedy its claims against 
Hazeltine. Finally, E-Systems has a right to a forum in the Utah 
courts, a right that may be unjustifiably thwarted in the 
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subsequent "race to the courthouse" after the futile administrative 
appeal is exhausted. 
Accordingly, the lower Court's holding should be reversed and 
its order granting Hazeltine's motion to dismiss and, in the 
alternative, motion for summary judgment should be vacated by this 
Court. The Court should remand with instructions to allow E-
Systems to proceed with its lawsuit or, alternatively, with 
instructions to stay E-Systems1 suit pending exhaustion of the 
administrative appeal to the FAA Contracting Officer. 
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